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I. INTRODUCTION
The evil that is in this world almost always comes of ignorance,
and good intentions may do as much harm as malevolence if they
lack understanding.
Albert Camus1
A common theory about the law is that it should seek to only criminalize
behavior that is motivated by malicious intent.2 This theory is fettered to the
core belief that inherently good people have good intentions, and therefore they
should not be held accountable for mere mistakes.3 While this might seem like
an innocent and idealistic notion, it is exploited by those who seek to
circumvent the law and rationalize their illegal behavior.4
Multiple areas of law that require a specific knowledge standard have
grappled with the notion of “good faith.” The reoccurring question asked is
whether good intentions negate the knowledge requirement of causes of action
that require a showing of specific intent.5 Patent infringement in the civil
forum is no exception, and the Supreme Court has put to rest the same issue in
the context of induced infringement claims.6
In an induced infringement claim, a patent owner asserts that the opposing
party has facilitated or otherwise indirectly encouraged third parties to infringe
upon the patent owner’s rights.7 Indirect infringement commonly occurs when
a manufacturer or advertiser sells a product and includes information about
how to assemble that product in a way that would directly infringe a patent held
by someone else.8 Induced infringement claims against the manufacturer or
advertiser are critical causes of action for patent owners because it would be
impractical and inequitable for the patent holder to locate every purchaser of
the patented product.9 In this way, induced infringement claims provide a
ALBERT CAMUS, THE PLAGUE 120 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 21st ed. 1980).
See Adam L. Alter, Julia Kernochan & John M. Darley, Morality Influences How People Apply the
Ignorance of the Law Defense, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 819 (2007); see also O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW 142 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. eds., 1881).
3 Alter, Kernochan & Darley, supra note 2, at 819–20.
4 William H. Theis, “Good Faith” as a Defense to Suits for Police Deprivations of Individual Rights, 59
MINN. L. REV. 991, 992 (1974).
5 William Roth, General vs. Specific Intent: A Time for Terminological Understanding in California, 7
PEPP. L. REV. 67 (1980).
6 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys. (Commil I), 720 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013), vacated, 135 S.
Ct. 1920 (2015).
7 Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 399, 400 (2005).
8 Id.
9 Id.
1
2
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means for patent holders to assert their rights and collect damages when they
otherwise could not.10 Recently, the Supreme Court rejected a new affirmative
defense against induced infringement claims based on the defendant’s good
faith belief in the patent’s invalidity. The Court held that this good faith belief
defense could potentially narrow the scope of liability, and allow inducers to
escape liability altogether.11
On June 25, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit affirmed the grant of a partial new trial and remanded a judgment of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas to allow the District Court
to reconsider the issue of indirect infringement in Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco
Systems.12 Cisco, the alleged infringer of U.S. Patent No. 6, 430, 395, appealed
the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
primarily on the basis of an erroneous jury instruction.13 That instruction
suggested that the jury could find Cisco liable for inducing infringement if
“Cisco actually intended to cause the acts that constitute direct infringement
and that Cisco knew or should have known that its actions would induce actual
infringement.”14
The Federal Circuit panel justified vacating the judgment of the trial court
for incorrectly instructing the jury to find Cisco liable for inducement based on
a “mere negligence” standard rather than the correct standard, which requires
actual knowledge.15 While the issue with the jury instruction was the central
basis for appeal, Cisco also alleged that the District Court improperly excluded
evidence, which would have shown that Cisco had a good faith belief in the
patent’s invalidity.16
Cisco reasoned, and the Federal Circuit ultimately held, that evidence of a
good faith belief in the invalidity of a patent is relevant for determining whether
a plaintiff has met the specific intent prong of an induced infringement claim.17
Therefore, the jury was entitled to consider any evidence showing a good faith
belief, with the understanding that the evidence would not “preclude a finding

Id.
Commil USA LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (Commil II), 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1920 (2015).
12 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 5, Commil USA LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (Commil I), 720
F.3d 1361 (2014) (No. 2012-1042) (2012 WL 1864604, at *57) [hereinafter Brief for PlaintiffAppellee]. The Federal Circuit ruled that evidence of a good faith belief in the invalidity of the
patent was relevant for determining induced infringement claims.
13 Id. at 1365.
14 Id. at 1366.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 1367.
17 Id.
10
11
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of induced infringement.”18 The Court implicitly held that inducers could raise
a new affirmative defense: a good faith belief in the invalidity of a patent.19
This Note argues that the Supreme Court correctly rejected the Federal a
Circuit’s holding and denied the creation of a new affirmative defense for
induced infringement claims.20
Part II.A discusses patent law’s purpose and provides an overview of 35
U.S.C. §§ 271(b) and 282, both of which provide the basis for finding induced
infringement. Part II.A also addresses the legal standard of an inducement
claim and considers the source of contention implicated by that standard. Part
II.B of this Note outlines the progression of Commil from the trial court level up
to the Supreme Court.21
Part III.A examines the goals of the patenting process and asserts the
Supreme Court’s holding in Commil reinforced the aims of patent law. Part III.B
looks to other areas of law that have a specific intent requirement, as they
provide guidance on how to interpret the specific intent requirement of
inducement claims in patent law and justify the Supreme Court’s ultimate
holding. Finally, part III.C considers the implications of introducing the good
faith belief of invalidity of a patent as an affirmative defense, ultimately arguing
that the Supreme Court correctly rejected the notion that a good faith belief in
the invalidity of a patent would negate the specific intent prong of inducement.

Id. at 1369.
See Bruce D. DeRenzi & Preetha Chakrabarti, The Federal Circuit’s New Factor For Induced
Infringement Escapes Rehearing En Banc and Creates Significant Uncertainty in Certain Patent Cases,
CROWELL MORING L. BLOG (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.crowell.com/Locations/New-York/
news/The-Federal-Circuits-New-Factor-For-Induced-Infringement-Escapes-Rehearing-En-Bancand-Creates-Significant-Uncertainty-In-Certain-Patent-Cases; see also The Increased Value of Invalidity
Opinions After the Federal Circuit’s Ruling in Commil USA v. Cisco Systems, 31 No. 8 WJCOMPI 1
(Sept. 19, 2013) (Westlaw).
20 The ABA subcommittee’s position supports the Supreme Court’s position on this matter.
See Proposed Subcommittee Report on Federal Circuit En Banc Review of Good-Faith Belief in Invalidity as a
Defense to Indirect Infringement, ABA IP 106 Patent Infringement Subcommittee Report, PTO011200
(Sept. 23, 2013).
21 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys. Inc. (Commil I), No. 2:07-CV-341, 2011 WL 738871 (E.D.
Tex., Feb. 23, 2011), aff’d, 410 Fed. Appx. 339 (Fed. Cir. Tex., Mar. 4, 2011), 720 F.3d 1361 (Fed.
Cir. Tex., June 25, 2013), reh’g denied, (Oct. 25, 2013), cert. granted in part, 720 F.3d 1361 (Dec. 5,
2014).
18
19
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II. BACKGROUND
A. THE PURPOSE OF PATENT LAW

Patent law is derived purely from constitutional and statutory authority
rather than common law.22 Article I, Section 8 of the United States
Constitution specifically states that “Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”23 Congress has the ability to promote sciences and the arts by
developing incentives for patent holders to create; patent holders develop their
patents knowing that they can profit from their creations for at least a limited
period of time.24 The limited time provision not only incentivizes creators, but
also compensates patent holders for the “enormous costs in terms of time,
research and development.”25
In 1998, the Seventh Circuit held that the following are the three aims of
patent law:
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it
promotes disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation
and to permit the public to practice the invention once the patent
expires; third, the stringent requirements for patent protection
seek to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for
the free use of the public.26
The law fully realizes these goals by conferring to patent holders “a
monopoly right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the patented invention.”27 Further, since “[a patent] is an incentive [to]
disclose,”28 the Constitution allows for more than just a method of incentivizing
the innovation of socially useful products. The limited time aspect of patent

22 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III, DONALD CRESS REILEY III, ROBERT CEARE HIGHLEY & PETER
D. ROSENBERG, Historical Note on Patents, in 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1:25 (2d ed. 2011).
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24 Id.
25 Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron Corporation, 94 S. Ct. 1879, 1885 (1974).
26 Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 284 (7th Cir. 1998).
27 Soonbok Lee, Induced Infringement as a Strict Liability Claim: Abolishment of the Specific Intent
Requirement, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 381 (2012). See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1996).
28 Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 65 S. Ct. 1143, 1145 (1945); JOHN GLADSTONE
MILLS III, DONALD CRESS REILEY III, ROBERT CEARE HIGHLEY & PETER D. ROSENBERG, A Patent
as a Grant; as a Contract, 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 22, § 1:2.
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law ensues that these products will contribute to the public domain upon the
patent’s expiration.29
When correctly distributed and regulated, patents serve the interests of not
only the patent holder, but also the general community.30 However, an
ineffective patent system risks halting the wheels of innovation and industry.31
Inventors may not have the incentive to create when others can easily and
cheaply infringe upon patents by making copies and alternatives.32 In order to
efficiently regulate this area of law and to ensure patents are enforceable,
Congress has enacted 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), which states, “whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sale, or sells any patent invention” may be liable
for direct infringement.33 This harm differs from induced infringement, a claim
Congress created in 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). Induced infringement can hold an
individual liable for infringement committed by others, whereas direct
infringement is limited to the defendant’s own infringing acts.34
1. Induced Infringement: 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). To prove induced infringement,
the plaintiff must show direct infringement by “the induced party, the inducer
must have knowledge of the asserted patents, the inducer must possess specific
intent and not merely knowledge of the acts alleged to induce, and there must
have been active inducement of the direct infringer.”35
The induced infringement cause of action ensures that those who encourage
or facilitate third parties to infringe are held liable even if they may have
escaped liability for direct infringement.36 Section 271(b) specifically relates to
inducement, stating, “Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall
be liable as an infringer.”37 The statute does not explicitly require “any
knowledge or intent of the inducer, but lower courts nevertheless have
consistently required a certain level of specific intent in the inducer.”38 It is this
level of intent that has been the source of contention and has provoked debate

See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 791 (2003).
1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 22, § 1:2; Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. 292 (1833).
31 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 22, § 1:2.
32 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III, DONALD CRESS REILEY III, ROBERT CEARE HIGHLEY &
PETER D. ROSENBERG, Need for Patents, in 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 22, § 1:24;
Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480 (1853).
33 Lee, supra note 27, at 381; 35 U.S.C. § 271(a); Richards v. British Petroleum, 869 F. Supp. 2d
730, 737 (E.D. La. 2012) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)).
34 See Lee, supra note 27, at 381–82.
35 Bel Fuse Inc. v. Molex Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 557 (D. N.J. 2014).
36 See, e.g., Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. L. REV.
1575, 1578 (2011).
37 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).
38 Lee, supra note 27, at 383 (referencing DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04[2]
(2010)).
29
30
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about whether actual knowledge is required or whether willful blindness will
suffice.39
In Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,40 the Supreme Court
acknowledged this specific intent requirement by stating, “[a]lthough the text of
§ 271(b) makes no mention of intent, we infer that at least some intent is
required.”41 The Court also noted the statute’s text was ambiguous and
wrestled with the definition of inducement, examining how to adequately
capture the culpable intent required under the statute.42 Ultimately, the Court
determined that “induced infringement requires under § 271(b) knowledge that
the induced acts constitute patent infringement.”43
Further, the Court acknowledged that “willful blindness” would also satisfy
the knowledge requirement under an inducement claim.44 A showing of willful
blindness requires that the alleged inducer “(1) . . . subjectively believe that there
is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate
actions to avoid learning of that fact.”45 By finding that willful blindness
satisfies the intent requirement, the Court held that an inducer cannot bury his
head in the sand and assert ignorance as a defense. Therefore, in order to
successfully assert an inducement claim, the plaintiff must show “evidence of
culpable conduct, directed to encouraging another’s infringement [and] not
merely that the inducer had knowledge of the direct infringer’s activities.”46
Once these elements have been met, the inducer may not use intentional
ignorance to relieve himself of liability.47
2. The Previous Dispute About Inducement Claims. The main area of contention
regarding inducement claims concerned the interpretation of the specific intent
prong.48 To be liable for induced infringement, the alleged inducer must not
only engage in the act of selling, marketing, or creating a patented product
without authority. He must also have actual knowledge that his actions
39 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). See Richard J. Stark &
Andrei Harasymiak, Inducement of Patent Infringement: The Intent Standard and Circumstantial Evidence of
Intent, 2011 WL 601766 (Feb. 2011).
40 131 S. Ct. at 2065.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 2068.
44 Id. at 2069 (the Court stated, “Given the long history of wilfull blindness . . . we can see no
reason why the doctrine should not apply in civil lawsuits for induced patent infringement under
35 U.S.C. § 271(b).”).
45 Id. at 2070.
46 DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios Inc., et al v. Grokster, LTD. et al., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2780 (2005), Manville Sales
Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
47 See id.
48 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1373.
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constitute inducement, not merely knowledge sufficient to complete the act
itself.49 The concept of inducement is primarily derived from tort law and the
concept of joint tortfeasors.50 This history suggests that in order for a plaintiff
to be made fully whole, all those involved in the collaborative infringement
must be held liable no matter how big or how small their role in the
wrongdoing. The same principle exists in patent law as the source of
inducement claims.
By including an intent requirement within any statute, a legislature imparts
liability not only for the action but also the culpable state of mind.51 This goal
relates to the generally accepted idea that the law should only seek to criminalize
those with malicious or deviant motives.52 The induced infringement cause of
action provides a means through which those who may not directly engage in
infringement, but who encourage or facilitate the infringement by others may
still be held accountable for their actions.53 To be liable, the inducer must have
actively and knowingly encouraged a third party to infringe.54 Knowing this is
an essential element to an inducement claim, Cisco attacked the specific intent
prong as the basis of its defense.55
In Commil, the alleged inducer Cisco argued that Commil’s patent was
invalid.56 Because one cannot infringe an invalid patent, Cisco further argued
that there could never have been any specific intent to infringe. Therefore, a
good faith belief of the patent’s invalidity would negate the culpable state of
mind required under the statute.57 Commil, on the other hand, argued that the
would-be third party infringer acted with the knowledge that there was a patent
for the product and that his or her actions would infringe the existing patent.58
Moreover, Commil argued it would undermine the patent process and
statutorily required presumption of validity to allow inducers to circumvent
liability by claiming they were simply mistaken in their belief in the invalidity of
a patent.59 This new affirmative defense of a good faith belief in the invalidity
of a patent would have given inducers the license to assume invalidity of patents

DSU Med. Corp., 471 F.3d at 1306.
Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1373.
51 See HOLMES, supra note 2.
52 E.g., Alter, Kernochan & Darley, supra note 2.
53 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780.
54 See id.
55 Def.-Appellant Br. Appeal at 41–42, Commil USA LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (Commil I),
720 F.3d 1361 (2014) (No. 2012-1042) (2012 WL 830381).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 12, at 39–40.
59 Id. at 47. See also ABA IP 106 Patent Infringement Subcommittee Report, supra note 20, at 2.
49
50
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in contradiction to Congress’s expressed preference.60 Additionally, the
infringer knew that a patent existed for that product and knew his actions
would likely or potentially constitute infringement.61 Therefore, Commil
suggested this awareness would suffice to hold Cisco liable under the statute.62
The Supreme Court ultimately agreed.63
3. The Presumption of Validity: 35 U.S.C. § 282(a). Thirty-five U.S.C. § 282(a)
addresses general defenses to patent infringement and states that, “In general a
patent shall be presumed valid.”64 The statute also states, “[t]he burden of
establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party
asserting such invalidity.”65 A party must prove invalidity by clear and
convincing evidence.66 The Federal Circuit has previously acknowledged that
this standard is not easy to overcome.67 The court stated, “in assailing the
validity of plaintiff’s patent regularly issued by the Patent Office, [the challenger
has] a heavy burden of proof . . . [such] presumption is not an idle gesture but is
a positive factor which must be overcome by the one asserting invalidity.”68
The rationale for presuming the validity of patents is “the basic proposition that
a government agency such as the [the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO)] was presumed to do its job.”69
B. PROCEDURAL POSTURE AND AN OVERVIEW OF COMMIL USA V. CISCO SYS.

Commil USA v. Cisco System began with a patent infringement claim by
Commil against Cisco.70 Both Cisco and Commil are suppliers of wireless
access communications systems.71 Commil originally produced patent ’395, a
patent for a product that allowed users within a mobile network to move more

Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 12.
Id. at 1.
62 Id. at 40.
63 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems Inc. (Commil II), 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1920 (2015).
64 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012). See also ABA IP 106 Patent Infringement Subcommittee Report,
supra note 20, at 13 (the committee notes that “Commil’s recognition of a good faith belief of
invalidity as a Defense cannot be reconciled with the presumption of Validity (§ 282)”).
65 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
66 Id.; OSRAM Sylvania, Inc. v. American Induction Technologies, Inc., 701 F.3d 698 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
67 Anderson Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 265 F.2d 755, 761 (7th Cir. 1959).
68 Id.
69 ABA IP 106 Patent Infringement Subcommittee Report, supra note 20, at 13 (citing
American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350 (C.A. Fed 1984)); see also
Microsoft Corp. v. 141 LTD. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2243 (2011).
70 Federal Circuit Vacates $63 Million Patent Verdict, Orders Another Trial Commil USA v. Cisco
Sys., 31 No. 4 WJCOMPI 2 (July, 25, 2013).
71 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1364.
60
61
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readily within the network without losing their connection.72 Commil alleged
that Cisco developed Wi-Fi access points and controllers that infringed three
claims of patent ’395.73 The jury trial began in May 2010, and the main issue
concerned whether Cisco could be liable for both direct infringement and
induced infringement.74 Cisco defended its actions and software by arguing that
Commil’s patent was invalid.75
The jury rejected Cisco’s assertion that the patent was invalid and found
Cisco liable for direct infringement but not induced infringement.76 The jury
awarded Commil $3.7 million in damages for its direct infringement claim.77
Yet despite winning on this claim, Commil filed a motion for a new trial to
reconsider its induced infringement claim and to reassess damages for the direct
infringement claim.78
1. A Second Trial. The district court granted Commil’s motion for a new
trial,79 and the second trial began in April 2011 to determine the viability of an
inducement claim and to reassess the damages.80 At the close of this
proceeding, the jury found Cisco liable for inducement and increased the
damages to $63.7 million.81 After the jury’s determination, the judge further
increased damages to account for prejudgment interest and costs, ultimately
requiring Cisco to pay Commil a total of $74 million.82 Cisco appealed this
judgment to the Federal Circuit, which issued the contentious June 25, 2013
ruling.83
2. On Appeal to the Federal Circuit. Cisco asserted six different claims on
appeal to the Federal Circuit.84 Cisco primarily took issue with the erroneous
jury instruction that allowed the jury to hold Cisco liable for induced
infringement on the grounds of mere negligence, rather than the required
knowledge standard.85 Cisco also alleged that the “District Court erroneously
precluded Cisco from presenting evidence of its good-faith belief of invalidity
Federal Circuit Vacates $63 Million Patent Verdict, supra note 70, at 2.
Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1364.
74 Id. at 1365.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Reply Br. For Def.-Appellant at 9-12, Commil USA LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (Commil I),
720 F.3d 1361 (2014) (No. 2012-1042) (2012 WL 2375037). Cisco contested this on appeal,
arguing that Commil was unable to show any direct infringement by any third party actor.
78 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1365.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1365–66.
72
73
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to show that it lacked the requisite intent to induce infringement of the asserted
claims.”86
The Federal Circuit reasoned that it had established “knew or should have
known” as the standard for inducement claims in 1990 and reaffirmed it in
2006.87 However, the court also acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s 2011
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.88 decision, which held that a finding of
inducement requires actual knowledge that the “induced acts constitute
infringement.” There, the Court rejected the negligence standard for induced
infringement claims.89 Because the district court had instructed the jury to
determine fault under an erroneous standard, the Federal Circuit panel in
Commil found that the instruction was prejudicial.90 Thus, in a 2–1 ruling with a
concurring opinion, the court vacated the judgment, remanded the induced
infringement claim, and ordered the reassessment of damages for a new trial.91
The Federal Circuit also discussed whether the district court erred in
omitting evidence that allegedly would have supported Cisco’s asserted good
faith belief of invalidity, rebutting the specific intent prong of the induced
infringement claim.92 Cisco based this argument on Global-Tech, which held that
a person may only be held liable for induced infringement he had “knowledge
that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.”93 Cisco’s argument
suggests that although one may have intentionally committed the acts
constituting infringement, if he truly believes the patent invalid, then he could
not have met the specific intent element of an inducement claim.94
The Federal Circuit panel noted that it was not perfectly clear from the trial
record why the trial court precluded Cisco from presenting its good faith belief
evidence at trial.95 Evidence in the pre-trial record revealed that the district
court likely precluded this evidence because it was a novel issue.96 Although a
good faith belief of non-infringement has always been relevant for inducement
claims, such evidence had never been permitted to determine the good faith
belief in a patent’s invalidity.97 These two iterations of a good faith belief differ
Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1366 (citing Manville, 917 F.2d at 553; DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1306
(Fed. Cir. 2006)).
88 Id. (citing Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 1367.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 1366 (citing Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. 2068).
94 Id. at 1367.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
86
87
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in that the good faith belief in non-infringement suggests that the defendant
truly did not know or believe he or she was infringing a patent.98 An example
of this kind of belief is if an inventor or seller created a product or sold it
without knowing or believing that the technology was already patented.99
Conversely, a good faith belief in the invalidity of a patent suggests that a
would-be infringer knew the patent existed and knew his acts could constitute
infringement, but thought that the technology or product was not properly
patented or should not have been patented in the first place.100 In this situation,
the inducer made a judgment call that the patent was invalid that turned out to
be wrong.101
The Federal Circuit panel in Commil held that evidence of a good faith belief
in a patent’s invalidity may negate the specific intent prong of inducement
because the panel saw “no principled distinction between a good-faith belief of
invalidity and a good faith belief of non-infringement for the purpose of
whether a defendant possessed the specific intent to induce infringement of a
patent.”102 The Federal Circuit panel considered decisions from several district
courts that grappled with the same issue and came to the same conclusion.103
However, the court found that although this evidence of a good faith belief in
invalidity is relevant to determine the intent prong of an induced infringement
claim, the existence of such evidence is not the end of the matter, and the
evidence does not “preclude a finding of induced infringement.”104 Instead, the
evidence of a good faith belief in patent invalidity should be admitted for a jury
to consider when it is determining whether a party had the requisite culpable
intent to be found liable for an induced infringement claim.105
3. Judge Newman’s Concurrence and Dissent. Judge Newman concluded that the
“change in the law” proposed by the majority would set a dangerous precedent
because a defendant could wrongfully use good faith belief of patent invalidity
as a defense to willful infringement.106 Further, she reasoned that the majority’s

See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See id.
100 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1368.
101 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 12, at 42–43.
102 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1368.
103 Id. See VNUS Med. Techs., Inc. v. Diomed Holdings, Inc., 2007 WL 2900532, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 2, 2007); Kolmes v. World Elastic Corp., 1995 WL 918081, at *10 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 18,
1995); DataQuill Ltd. v. High Tech Computer Corp., 887 F. Supp. 2d 888, 1012–13 (S.D. Cal.
2011); see also Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 243 (2005).
But see Applera Corp. v. MJ Research Inc., 2004 WL 367616, at *1 (D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2004);
LadaTech, LLC v. Illumina, Inc., 2012 WL 1188266, at *2 (D. Del. Feb. 14, 2012).
104 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1369.
105 Id. The request for a rehearing en banc was later denied, leading to the petition for certiorari.
106 Id.
98
99
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argument that good faith “belief in invalidity can negate infringement is
contrary to the principles of tort liability, codified in the inducement statute”107
and that the majority’s holding also contradicted the basic notion that a mistake
of law cannot discharge liability.108
Judge Newman also suggested that defendants still had available the
defenses of patent invalidity and unenforceability to combat a claim of induced
infringement, so any additional defense would be unwarranted.109 She further
noted that good faith belief in the invalidity of the patent does not “negate [the]
infringement of a valid and enforceable patent,”110 and such a finding is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Global-Tech.111 Although 35
U.S.C. § 271(b) “requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent
infringement,” the district court in Commil did not hold that belief of invalidity
was an element or component of induced infringement.112
Judge Newman also asserted in her dissent that the majority misinterpreted
the Supreme Court’s holding in Global-Tech by blurring the distinction between
the knowledge requirement for infringement and the knowledge of validity,
which “are distinct issues, bearing different burdens, different presumptions,
and different evidence.”113
4. Judge O’Malley’s Concurrence and Dissent. The firm belief that patent cases
can only truly be tried “after considering the totality of the circumstances” is the
primary basis of Judge O’Malley’s dissent.114 Unlike Judge Newman, Judge
O’Malley agreed with the majority’s decision that the induced infringement
judgment must be vacated because the jury was instructed using the wrong legal
standard, and because a good faith belief in invalidity is relevant to defeat the
specific intent prong of an inducement claim.115 However, Judge O’Malley
diverged from the majority’s opinion for two reasons.116 First, she believed that
the claim of inducement must fail as a matter of law because Commil was
unable to show “any third-party practices” that would constitute
infringement.117 Second, a partial retrial would wrongfully deprive Cisco of its
Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury.118
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1373–74.
Id. at 1374.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2069).
Id. at 1374–75. See also 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).
Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1380.
Id.
Id. at 1376.
Id.
Id.
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Judge O’Malley suggested that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings during the
partial retrial “reflect[ed] the awkward posture in which [the trial judge] had
placed the case,”119 which resulted in the exclusion of evidence that could have
shown Cisco’s good faith belief in the invalidity of patent ’395.120 Judge
O’Malley also reminded the majority of Commil’s argument that it would be
unnecessarily confusing for the jury to consider such evidence without also
considering the issue of validity.121 Ultimately, Judge O’Malley reasoned that
the good faith defense and the validity claims were so “interwoven” that the
jury must decide both of these issues together.122 A better solution, she
reasoned, would require both issues, defense and validity claims, to be retried
together by a third jury in order to not violate Cisco’s right to “pursue a valid
defense.”123
Judge O’Malley cautioned that on remand, the trial court should carefully
craft the jury instructions and should take measures to ensure that the jury
understands that Cisco was wrong to assume patent ’395’s invalidity.124
However, she acknowledged that this warning is problematic because it would
taint the jury’s perception of Cisco and its beliefs from the start.125
5. The Supreme Court’s Decision. Ultimately, Commil petitioned the Supreme
Court for certiorari on January 23, 2014, and on December 5, 2014, the
Supreme Court granted the petition on the question of whether the Federal
Circuit erred in holding that the good faith belief of invalidity of a patent
defense was viable against an induced infringement claim.126 After hearing oral
arguments on March 31, 2015, the Supreme Court came down with a final
ruling on May 26, 2015.127 A 6–2 Court vacated the judgment and remanded
the proceedings.128
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the court and remarked that this was
an issue of first impression.129 The Court unsurprisingly held that the
defendant’s belief regarding the invalidity of the patent was irrelevant when
interpreting the scienter requirement for an induced infringement claim.130 The
Id. at 1379.
Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., SCOTUS Blog, http://www.scotusblog.com/cas
e-files/cases/commil-usa-llc-v-cisco-systems-inc/.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Commil USA LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (Commil II), 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (2015).
130 Id. (Justice Breyer is noted however as taking no part in the decision of this case).
119
120
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Court grounded its reasoning in the notion that the specific intent element of an
induced infringement concern is wholly separate from the issue of validity.131
Because of this distinction, the Court held that belief of validity may not negate
the scienter requirement.132
Further, the fact that infringement and invalidity are considered completely
separate matters under patent law supports this holding. They bear different
burdens, different presumptions, and different evidence.133 Additionally, noninfringement and invalidity are listed as two separate defenses in patent law.134
Allowing the defense of a good faith belief of invalidity would inappropriately
“conflate” the two issues.135 The Court also acknowledged that an individual
has several avenues to obtain a ruling of invalidity.136 These include filing a
declaratory judgment action to declare the patent invalid, seeking inter parte
review at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, which may deliver a decision in as
little as twelve months, or seeking ex parte reexamination of the patent by the
PTO.137
The Court clarified, though, that such measures do not preclude the alleged
infringer from raising the invalidity defense.138 If the court acknowledges that
the patent is indeed invalid, the alleged infringer will be absolved from all
liability as is the case in a tortious interference with a contract claim.139 The
Supreme Court’s holding merely precluded the good faith belief of invalidity
when the patent was deemed valid and enforceable.140 Such a determination is
based on critical timing and the orderly administration of the patent system.141
The Court rationalized this holding as consistent with other areas of civil law
where an actor who lacked actual knowledge that his conduct violated the law,
he may still be found liable, as is the case with trespass.142
The Court reasoned that any other finding would risk undermining the longheld presumption that a patent is valid and would allow defendants to
“circumvent” the “high bar-the clear and convincing standard” defendants have

Id. at 1928.
Id. at 1931.
133 Id. at 1929.
134 Id. But see 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1), (2).
135 Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1928.
136 Id. at 1929.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. The Court noted that a month before the second trial, Cisco attempted to obtain a ruling
from the PTO that the patent was actually invalid. Much to their dismay, the PTO determined
that patent was indeed valid and enforceable.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 1930.
131
132
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been previously required to meet in order to rebut.143 With a final flourish, the
Court seemingly admonished the lower courts for allowing such a frivolous
claim.144 Although no allegation of frivolity or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11 sanctions had been asserted, the Court alluded that this may have been such
a case.145
6. Justice Scalia’s Dissent. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Roberts in
dissenting. Both would have permitted the defendants to raise a good faith
belief in a patent’s invalidity as a defense to induced infringement.146 Justice
Scalia began his argument by reasoning that it was “nonsense” that someone
could infringe an invalid patent.147 He reasoned that because only valid patents
could be infringed and one could only be guilty of inducement if they intended
to induce infringement, then it follows that someone may not be guilty of
induced infringement unless he knows he is in fact infringing.148
He further found the majority’s reasoning unconvincing.149 He admonished
that although the law treats infringement and validity as distinct, the good faith
belief of invalidity conflates the two no more than “saying that water cannot
exist without oxygen ‘conflates’ water and oxygen.”150 Thus, the fact that
infringement requires validity maintains those concepts’ separateness under the
law.151 Justice Scalia also expresses doubt that merely recognizing the good
faith defense would undermine the strong presumption of validity.152 He
maintained that even if an alleged induced infringer succeeds in this context, he
merely escapes liability for a third party’s infringement.153 That does not mean
that the patent itself wasn’t valid to begin with.154
Finally, Justice Scalia rationalized that an invalid patent does not confer a
right to exclusivity.155 Therefore, an individual asserting the good faith belief of
invalidity defense has not intentionally violated the patent holder’s right, which
the induced infringement causes of action targets. Justice Scalia ended his
opinion by suggesting that he has not proposed creating a defense to statutory

143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1931.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1932.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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liability.156 Rather, he has merely attempted to reconcile the Patent Act with the
proposed defense to determine whether such a defense could undermine the
specific intent prong of induced infringement claims.157 He ultimately found
that it does.
After several years of litigation, it seems there is finally an answer. The
Supreme Court has rejected the good faith of the invalidity of a patent defense
for inducement and rightfully so. To hold otherwise would have dangerously
narrowed the scope of liability for induced infringement claims. In reaching
this conclusion, the Court alluded to other areas of the law that have similarly
rejected a “good faith” defense. Upon closer examination of these other bodies
of law, it seems that the Court’s conclusion was inevitable.
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE AIMS OF PATENT LAW AND THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY

As the Supreme Court articulated, patents are presumed valid, and the party
challenging validity bears the burden of rebutting it.158 In order to remain
consistent with the presumption and reinforce the aims of patent law, the
Supreme Court had to reject the good faith belief defense. One of the primary
issues the lower courts faced in determining whether the good faith belief in a
patent’s invalidity could defeat an induced infringement claim was the fact that
this defense was a novel issue in patent law.159 In order to adequately justify the
Supreme Court’s holding, one must consider the premise of the good faith
belief of invalidity defense in the context of other areas of law. Part III.B
considers other bodies of law including tort, contract, and criminal law, which
have also addressed the issue of whether a good faith belief negates the specific
intent prong of various causes of action.160 Ultimately, all of these areas of law
show that the good faith belief of invalidity defense is inconsistent with
generally accepted norms and American jurisprudence. Further, Part III.C
concludes by arguing that introducing such a defense would have negative
implications. Therefore, the Supreme Court was right not to allow such a
defense in the area of patent law.
Although Commil correctly argued that one cannot infringe upon an invalid
patent, there is a crucial difference between knowing that acts would constitute
Id.
Id.
158 Id. at 1929; 35 U.S.C. § 282.
159 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1367.
160 This Note agrees with the Supreme Court and the ABA subcommittee on this issue. See
ABA IP 106 Patent Infringement Subcommittee Report, supra note 20, at 2.
156
157
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infringement and deciding to infringe or induce infringement anyway.161 In the
second scenario, the would-be infringer (here, Cisco) has taken his chances at
facing liability for infringement or inducement and lost. The latter inducer
therefore has a far more culpable state of mind than the individual who has a
good faith belief in non-infringement or the individual wrongly accused of
infringement.162
Further, Congress clearly expressed its preference for the presumption of
validity in 35 U.S.C. § 282 by stating, “a patent shall be presumed valid.”163
Within the same statute, Congress has afforded the defense of invalidity to
defeat this presumption.164 However, once an actual or induced infringer has
failed to overcome the presumption of validity, he may be held liable.165
Section 282 is silent regarding the infringer or inducer’s state of mind when
asserting the invalidity defense.166 The statute provides that patents are
presumed valid unless a showing of invalidity or another applicable defense
under the statute can defeat the presumption.167 Arguably, Congress’s total
silence on intent suggests it never intended the infringer’s subjective
motivations be taken into account when attempting to defeat the presumption
of validity.168 Congress intended for actual invalidity, not merely an infringer’s
good faith belief, to defeat liability.169
B. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE GOOD FAITH BELIEF DEFENSE

The area of intellectual property law is rapidly evolving.170 With increases in
technology and innovation, the law has been forced to adapt in order to meet
society’s constantly changing needs.171 Congress has attempted to bridge the
gap and enforce legislation with regulatory agencies such as the PTO, which
attends to the particular needs of patent holders and creators.172 However,
Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1368.
See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 12, at 42–43.
163 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).
164 Id. § 282(b)(2).
165 See id.
166 See Vivian Lei, Is the Doctrine of Inducement Dead?, 50 IDEA 875 (2010).
167 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) (2012). (Other defenses under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) include noninfringement or invalidity for the failure to comply with the filing requirements under the statute.)
168 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 12, at 47 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989)).
169 See id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 282(b).
170 See S. Jay Plager, Challenges for Intellectual Property Law in the Twenty-First Century: Indeterminacy
and Other Problems, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 69; see also Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude:
Intellectual Property Law, 1900–2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187 (2000).
171 Plager, supra note 170; Merges, supra note 170.
172 See Lee, supra note 27, at 381–82.
161
162
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where Congress is silent, the courts may turn to the common law to bridge the
gap.173 Thus, in order to reconcile the good faith belief of invalidity defense,
the Supreme Court considered other areas of law confronting this same issue of
a knowledge standard and whether a good faith belief may negate that
knowledge requirement in other contexts.174
1. In the Context of Tort Law. To start, the Supreme Court relied upon
principles from tort law.175 Tort law is publicly made law that is privately
enforced by individual plaintiffs.176 Similarly, patent law is public made law and
privately enforced by the patent holder.177 Since the concept of induced
infringement is primarily based on the notion of joint tortfeasors,178 patent law
is arguably most analogous to tort law. This made tort law a logical place for
the Court to start when considering how other areas of law treat the good faith
belief defense.
The notion of holding co-conspirators liable for harms, even if the
defendant is not the direct actor, is an established concept in tort law.179 One
author suggests “[t]he common law of torts has long punished not only
tortfeasors but also those who aid and abet the commission of a tort.”180
Originally, this “doctrine was initially applied in patent law in cases involving
what we think of today as contributory infringement.”181 Contributory
infringement is similar to induced infringement in that a person is held liable for
providing a means through which another individual may infringe.182 However,
contributory infringement differs from inducement because inducement
requires a higher showing of intent.183 Not only must one facilitate the means
by which to aid another’s infringement (perhaps through supplying component
parts that in themselves may not infringe but when combined constitute
infringement), but one must also knowingly intend to aid the infringement and
recognize they are completing acts that would constitute infringement.184

Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985).
Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1930.
175 Id.
176 Christian Turner, Law’s Public/Private Structure, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1003, 1012–13 (2012).
177 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (2012).
178 Charles E. Miller, Some Views on the Law of Patent Infringement by Inducement, 53 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 86, 90 (1971).
179 Lemley, supra note 103, at 227; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS
499–532 (5th ed. 1984).
180 KEETON ET AL., supra note 179, at 499–522.
181 Id.
182 See Miller, supra note 178, at 90.
183 See generally id. at 99–102.
184 Lemley, supra note 103, at 232.
173
174
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In addition to its basis on the joint tortfeasors doctrine, the notion of
inducement closely relates to and derives from the concepts of respondeat
superior and vicarious liability.185 Absent the direction of the inducer, the
infringer would not have participated in the acts that constitute infringement.186
Because the principal inducer benefitted financially from the direct infringers’
actions, the inducer should be held liable for their torts.187
Further, one commentator suggests that the imposition of liability in tort law
at times turns on whether the tortious conduct was a mistake or an accident.188
“The legal idea of accident [negates] intention and negligence” because the
actor never intended the action to occur, nor for the effects of the tortious
action to take place.189 Additionally, in the context of an accident, it is not
probable that the conduct would result in the consequences that in fact
occurred.190 However, in cases where a “mistake” occurs in the tort context,
“the error is intended and the error consists in thinking that such an effect is
not tortious.”191 For example, “[i]f the hunter shoots at a thing which he
reasonably supposes to be a bear, but which turns out to be a shepherd’s dog,
he has committed a trespass to personal under mistake.”192 This example is
akin to the good faith belief of invalidity of a patent defense because “the
contact was intended under a mistaken idea that it was injury to no one.”193
Thus, in cases where “the effect is intended,” the error does not negate the
intent element of the tort.194 As the Supreme Court noted, intention to commit
the act at all—rather than intent to act wrongfully—satisfies the intent prong.195
Here, a mistake about the invalidity of a patent cannot absolve inducers from
liability because they intended the actions that constitute infringement, and it
was probable that the infringement would occur because of the knowledge of
the patent.196
Despite the fact that Cisco’s conduct in Commil may be characterized as a
mistake, rather than an accident, if Cisco could establish that it made the
mistake non-negligently, then arguably Cisco’s actions could constitute an

185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196

Id. at 228–29.
Id.
Id.
Clarke Butler Whittier, Mistake in the Law of Torts, 15 HARV. L. REV. 335, 336 (1902).
Id.
Id. at 336–37.
Id.
Id. at 337.
Id.
Id.
Commil USA LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (Commil II), 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930 (2015).
See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 12, at 37.
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accident.197 Thus, characterizing a good faith belief in patent invalidity as an
accident would excuse the liability.198 A “negligent mistake may be defined as
one which a prudent man under the circumstances would not make.”199
However, as the Court noted, Cisco was, at best “careless in entertaining the
belief” the patent was invalid and acting on it without first inquiring to the
patent office or seeking a declaratory judgment on the invalidity of the patent.200
It is well settled that “in the case of mistake the defendant is usually held to act
at his peril.”201 Even assuming Cisco acted under a good faith belief in the
invalidity of a patent, it acted with knowledge of the patent’s existence, and thus
acted at its own peril.202 As such, the Supreme Court correctly found that
liability under a traditional tort theory would attach.203
2. In the Context of the Social Contract Theory and Traditional Contract Law. The
Supreme Court acknowledged that if the patent is truly invalid, induced
infringers would not be held liable, just as those accused of tortious interference
with a contract may not be held liable if a contract is in fact invalid.204 What
makes the traditional contract analysis in this context so difficult is that in an
induced infringement claim, the one at fault is arguably not a party to the
contract, but rather, a third party actor.205 Therefore, Cisco’s actions, at first
glance, seem most analogous to a tortious interference with a contract, which is
actually a blend of both tort and contract law causes of action.206 From a
broader perspective, however, society is actually a party to the patent,
represented by the government and the patent holder.
Congress has conferred authority to the patent office to enter into private
contracts with patent holders in order to ensure that society continues to
benefit from the creations of inventors and producers.207 In this regard, the
Whittier, supra note 188, at 339.
Id.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 337 (stating that if there was no negligence in making the mistake, the case was one of
accident and would prevent recovery); Commil USA LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (Commil II), 135
S. Ct. 1920, 1929 (2015).
201 Whittier, supra note 188, at 352.
202 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 12, at 34.
203 Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1929.
204 Id. at 1920, 1930.
205 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 9 (1981).
206 See Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort
and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1982).
207 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217 (2003) (quoting
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“The basic quid pro quo for granting a patent
monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility.”)
(quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
197
198
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American people have consented to respect the patents issued by the patent
office and the rights of patent holders.208 The infringer and inducer, as citizens
of the United States, have also consented to follow the laws of the nation and
to respect the wishes of Congress by respecting the patent process.209
Infringing or inducing others to infringe a patent materially breaches the social
contract entered into by society’s agents, Congress and the PTO.210
Although the Court did not delve into this method of reasoning, this social
contract theory applies to Commil. By doing business in the American market
and being an American company, Cisco has consented to the laws enacted by
Congress and the social contract entered into by society’s agents. When Cisco
infringed and induced infringement on Commil’s wireless communications
systems, it breached the social contract and cannot assert that the breach was
justified simply because it presumed the contract was invalid or
unenforceable.211
Further, patent law can readily be analogized to contract law because “the
weight of authority is that a patent is very much a contract between the inventor
and the United States.”212 The Court correctly acknowledged that a patent
confers the right of the inventor to “practice his invention and the right to
allow another to practice such invention under terms agreed to between the
parties.”213 Unlike copyright, which requires the author to disclose his idea or
concept to the audience upon publication, patents protect the patent holder’s
ideas and technology for the terms of the patent.214 This “exchange” between
the patent holder and the government is commonly referred to as a “quid pro
quo” between the patent holder and the government.215 In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the
Supreme Court noted that “complete disclosure as a precondition of a patent is
part of the quid pro quo that justifies the limited monopoly for the inventor as
consideration for full and immediate access by the public when the time
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors . . . Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards
commensurate with services rendered.”)))).
208 See Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1999).
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 (1981); see also
id. §§ 153–154.
212 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III, DONALD CRESS REILEY III, ROBERT CEARE HIGHLEY & PETER
D. ROSENBERG, 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1:2 (2d ed. 2014); Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1929.
213 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 212, § 1:3.
214 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217 (2003).
215 Id. (referencing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966)); see, e.g.,
J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi–Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (“The
disclosure required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.’ ” (quoting
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974))).
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expires.”216 Also, the Eldred court cited language in which the patent system
was described as a “contract” between the patent holder and the government.217
This quid pro quo language also bolsters the notion that the rights between
contracting parties in traditional contract law are similar to the rights of the
patent holder.218
Further, like patents, contracts are generally presumed valid and
enforceable.219 It is the burden of the party asserting invalidity to prove that the
contract is unenforceable or void as a matter of public policy.220
Moreover, contract law also has a similar concept to patent law’s willful
blindness doctrine called “conscious ignorance.”221 Under § 154 of the Second
Restatement of Contracts, the party who acts knowing that he has limited
knowledge of the terms of the contract under the circumstances, “bears the risk
of the mistake.”222 Applying this principle to Commil, the Court acted wisely
when finding that good faith belief of invalidity of a patent is not a viable
defense under a contract theory because Cisco acted based on its knowledge
that a patent was in place, but failed to reconcile the validity of the patent at the
outset.223
3. Tortious Interference with Contract. The Supreme Court in Commil did
reference, however, the similar nature of a tortious interference with a contract
claim and an induced infringement claim.224 Tortious interference with a
contract blends tort and contract law.225 This cause of action is recognized
under the common law to give “a party to a contract . . . a right of action
against a third-party who intentionally and unjustifiably induces a breach of the

Eldred, 537 U.S. at 225; see Graham, 383 U.S. at 5.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 225 (quoting “Attorney General Wirt made this precise point in his
argument in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., at 175, 6 L. Ed. 23: ‘It [a patent] is virtually a contract
between each patentee and the people of the United States, by which the time of exclusive and
secure enjoyment is limited, and then the benefit of the discovery results to the public.’ ”).
218 See Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Mutuality and Consideration, 28 HARV. L. REV. 121, 134 (1914)
(“[Q]uid pro quo (i. e., present value actually received on each side in the making of the contract).”).
219 Ohio & M.R. Co. v. McCarthy, 96 U.S. 258 (1877) (“Where such a contract is not, on its
face, necessarily beyond the scope of the powers of the corporation, it will, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, be presumed to be valid.”).
220 See generally Meunier v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 3:12-cv-01005-JE, 2014 WL
4792935 (Dis. Or. Sept. 24, 2014); In re Walker, 515 B.R. 725 (Banker W.D. Mo. 2014); Mansfield
v. Vanderbilt Mortg. and Finance, Inc., No. 7:13-CV-257-FL, 2014 WL 2712327 (E.D. N.C. June
16, 2014); Brondyke v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (S.D. Iowa 2013).
221 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154, cmt. (c) (1981).
222 Id.
223 Commil II, 135 S. Ct. 1929.
224 Id. at 1930.
225 See Perlman, supra note 206, at 61.
216
217
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contract with the other party to the contract.”226 The inducer has caused the
buyers of its product to directly infringe, and has interfered with the business
relationship between the patent holder and the government.227 Further, the
underlying principles of both tortious interference with a contract and the
induced infringement causes of action are similar. A tortious interference with
a contract claim seeks to hold those who “intentionally intermeddle with the
business affairs of another” liable.228 Like the inducement statute,229 the
tortious interference with a contract cause of action targets the actual breach of
the contract, but the inducer’s state of mind.230
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 recognizes the claim of tortious
interference with a contract and states:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the
performance of a contract . . . between another and a third
person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to
perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the
pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third
person to perform the contract.231
The common elements for tortious interference with a contract mirror
inducement in several respects. Those include the existence of a contract or
business relationship between the plaintiff and a third party, the defendant’s
knowledge of the existence of the contract, the defendant acts in an
unjustifiable manner in causing either the third party to breach or make the
performance of the contract impossible, and damages.232
Considering Cisco’s actions in light of the elements of tortious interference
with a contract, liability naturally follows. The district court rejected the notion
that the patent was invalid or unenforceable, and a finding to the contrary
would prevent a finding of direct infringement.233 Although Cisco argued that
it acted in justifiable reliance on the invalidity of the patent, as the Supreme
Court noted, they had no justifiable belief or reason to think that the patent was
226 Mark S. Dennison, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationship Involving Sale of Real Estate, 64
AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 273, 284 (2001).
227 See Allen, supra note 208, at 2; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010); U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
228 See Dennison, supra note 226.
229 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
230 See Perlman, supra note 206, at 61.
231 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
232 Id.; see also Donathan v. McDill, 800 S.W.2d 433, 434 (1990); Second Continental, Inc. v.
Atlanta E-Z Builders, Inc., 514 S.E.2d 846, 849 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999), cert. dismissed, 1999 Ga.
LEXIS 747 (1999); Baldwin Properties, Inc. v. Sharp, 949 S.W.2d 952, 956 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
233 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1365. See also 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010).
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invalid.234 At the very least, Cisco acted in a manner of “willful blindness” by
not seeking a declaratory judgment on the validity of the patent before
knowingly producing and selling the patented product unlawfully.235
Further, Cisco’s actions made the full performance of the contract between
Commil and the patent office impossible because the patent allowed Commil
the ability to gain the full economic benefits from their creation for twenty
years.236 Because of Cisco’s actions, Commil lost the full benefits of exclusivity
afforded under the terms of the patent.237 Finally, Commil can show damages
by offering evidence of Cisco’s profits from the patented product.238
Since the concept of tortious interference with a contract is a blend of tort
and contract law, the same principle that mistake is generally not a defense still
applies.239 Cisco acted intentionally, knowing that there was a business and
contractual relationship between the general public and the patent holder.240
However, rather than presuming the enforceability of this contract and seeking
the judicial remedies available to them through a declaratory judgment, Cisco
acted at its peril by selling the patented product to the general public.241
Therefore, the Court correctly imposed liability because neither the areas of tort
law, contract law, or the blended concept of tortious interference with a
contract recognize that a good faith belief can negate the specific intent prong
of these causes of action.242
4. In the Context of Criminal Law. The Supreme Court further found that the
good faith belief in the invalidity of a patent defense is analogous to the mistake
of law defense in the criminal context.243 Criminal law is publicly made and
publicly prosecuted, and therefore differs from patent law, which is publicly
made and privately prosecuted.244 However, principles of the mistake of law
defense have previously offered the Court guidance on how to treat defendants
234 See Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1929; see also Dennison, supra note 226, at 341–42 (stating, “The
concept of ‘good faith’ is not measured by a subjective standard so that a misunderstanding or
misinterpretation of the law excuses no one and provides no legal justification for unauthorized
interference. Subjective good faith, standing alone, is not an absolute defense to a claim of
tortious interference with business relations, just as malice within the meaning of such a claim
need not be prompted by bad faith or personal dislike.”).
235 See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. 2071–72.
236 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
237 Id.
238 Pl.[’s].–Appellee Br. Appeal at 23–24.
239 See Dennison, supra note 226, at 341.
240 Pl.[’s].–Appellee Br. Appeal at 32. See also Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068.
241 Pl.[’s].–Appellee Br. Appeal at 37.
242 See Whittier, supra note 188, at 335–36; Dennison, supra note 226, at 341; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154, cmt. (c) (1981).
243 Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1930.
244 Turner, supra note 176, at 1012.
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who assert that they mistakenly violated the law through a subjective good faith
belief.245
Like the mistake of law defense, those who assert that they had a good faith
belief in the invalidity of a patent do not assert that they are necessarily
innocent or not culpable.246 Induced infringers admit that their actions
technically infringed upon the patent and perhaps facilitated the means by
which others were able to infringe.247 However, they also claim that they did
not have the culpable state of mind to be held liable for this infringement.248
In Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc., the Federal Circuit court
“concluded that the alleged inducer did not possess the specific intent to
encourage another’s infringement.”249 The Federal Circuit found that induced
infringement claims should be treated like specific intent standards within the
common law.250 For example, murder, “requires not only the general intent to
engage in the acts constituting the offense, but an ‘additional deliberate and
conscious purpose or design of accomplishing a very specific and remote
result.’ ”251 Similarly, a patent holder in an infringement case must show not
only that the inducer engaged in the acts that caused infringement, but also that
the inducer had knowledge that infringement was likely to occur.252 As
previously held by the Federal Circuit, knowledge of the patent’s existence can
serve as evidence of the infringer or inducer’s intent.253
In the criminal context, mistake of law is not a viable defense.254 Several
reasons make the mistake of law defense problematic:
[M]any justifications have been proffered for denying ignorance
of the law defense: the difficulty of disproving a claim of
ignorance, the goal of encouraging citizens to know and obey the

Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2062–63. The Supreme Court looked to criminal law and applied it
to the induced infringement context when establishing the notion of willful blindness.
246 See Holbrook, supra note 7, at 404–07.
247 See id.
248 See id.
249 917 F.2d at 553–54; Lei, supra note 166, at 879.
250 917 F.2d at 553–54.
251 Lei, supra note 166, at 879. See also Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 12.
252 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 12.
253 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. at 2067–68.
254 See United States v. Rampton, 762 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2014) (stating “[t]he general rule that
ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no offense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in
the American legal system.” Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991)); see also United
States v. Lain, 640 F.3d 1134, 1139 (10th Cir. 2011).
245
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law, and the need to prevent an accused person’s idiosyncratic
interpretation from attaining the status of a legal rule.255
The same concerns prevail in the patent context.
As the Court recognized, proving a good faith belief of invalidity of a patent
would mirror the same difficulties as proving ignorance of the law defense.256
In general, the better policy is to assume that the general public knows the
law.257 Like in the criminal context, where defendants argue that although they
broke the law, this law should not be a law in the first place, the alleged inducer
may argue that this product is not patentable.258
In the present dispute, Cisco argued that the patent was invalid for similar
reasons.259 The jury and the Supreme Court expressly rejected this assertion.260
Thus, just as criminals may not assert that they knew there was a law, but
thought it meant something else or that it was not a good law to begin with,
Cisco cannot assert that it operated under a good faith belief the patent was
invalid and escape liability. As the Court realized, to hold otherwise would
undermine the credibility of the Patent Office and Congress’s general
authority.261
C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S HOLDING AND SOLUTION HAD
THE SUPREME COURT DENIED CERT OR RECOGNIZED THE DEFENSE

As the Court suggested, allowing the defense of good faith belief of the
invalidity of a patent would remove any incentive to take preventive measures
or to act cautiously.262 Just as willful blindness and ignorance are not valid
defenses, a good faith belief that a patent is invalid may not be a defense
either.263 The rationale is that in general, the law exists to discourage self-help
remedies.264
The Court proposed that the inducer has access to judicial resources to
determine the validity of the patent at the outset, such as petitioning the PTO

Alter, Kernochan & Darley, supra note 2, at 820.
Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1930.
257 See generally id.
258 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)(3) (2012).
259 Commil I, 720 F.3d at 1365; Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1930.
260 See Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1930.
261 Id.
262 Id. at 1930–31.
263 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. at 2063. See Stark & Harasymiak, supra
note 39.
264 Adam B. Badawi, Self-Help and the Rules of Engagement, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 1 (2012) (“Many
areas of law . . . completely forbid the use of self-help.”).
255
256
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for post grant review or a declaratory judgment.265 Not utilizing this tool,
which the courts provide when the inducer knows that there has been a patent
granted, defeats the argument that the inducer acted in good faith. One who
truly acts in good faith would arguably confer with the patent holder, the Patent
Office, or the courts from the start.266 Good faith does not condone the
“better to ask forgiveness than permission” approach that occurred here, and
the Supreme Court rightfully rejected any notion of good faith in this situation.
Further, the Court recognized that the potential for fraud and deceit is great
because a good faith belief defense is merely subjective and impossible to
ascertain.267 Any time a party is accused of induced infringement, the inducer
will merely argue that he did not believe the patent was truly valid, which would
defeat liability.268 This creates a confusing and impossibly subjective inquiry for
jurors.269 As the Court further articulated, allowing the defense would also
undermine the integrity of the patent process and rob patent holders of the
security their patents provide.270 Allowing such a defense contradicts not only
the aims of the patent process but also Congress’s expressed preference to
presume the validity of patents,271 which demands the rejection of the good
faith belief of invalidity of a patent defense.272
The inducer unquestionably is in the best position to assert invalidity at the
outset with a declaratory judgment or through petitioning for reconsideration
through the PTO, for litigation is a costly matter.273 In the present dispute, the
parties went through two trials at the district court level, an appeal to the
Federal Circuit, and a Supreme Court hearing four years later.274 In reality, had
Cisco sought a declaratory judgment at the outset to determine the validity of
the patent, this entire dispute could have been resolved without tying up as

Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1930; 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012).
Such a notion is not uncommon within the common law and relates back to the standard of
the reasonable man we see in the tort context. Just as tortfeasors may be liable for acts and
omissions that fall below the standard of care, so too should inducers in the above situation. See
Baltimore & P.R. Co. v. Jones, 95 U.S. 439 (1877).
267 Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1931; see also Alter, Kernochan & Darley, supra note 2, at 820.
268 Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1930.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 1929; ABA IP 106 Patent Infringement Subcommittee Report, supra note 20, at 2;
Pl.[‘s].–Appellee Br. Appeal at 47.
271 35 U.S.C. § 282.
272 ABA IP 106 Patent Infringement Subcommittee Report, supra note 20, at 13.
273 See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966) (“To await litigation isfor all practical purposes-to debilitate the patent system.”).
274 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc. (Commil I), 2011 WL 738871 (E.D. Tex., Feb. 23,
2011), aff’d, 410 Fed. Appx. 339 (Fed. Cir. Tex. Mar. 4, 2011), 720 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. Tex., June
25, 2010), rehearing denied (October 25, 2013), cert. granted in part, 720 F.3d 1361 (Dec. 5, 2014).
265
266
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much judicial time and resources and without the massive cost to both the
inducer and the patent holder.
To allow a good faith belief of invalidity defense when the inducer has failed
to go through the judicial remedies afforded to them at the outset would have
condoned this wasteful behavior. By allowing this to occur, the Supreme Court
would have contravened of Congress’s intent and disincentived creators and
producers because they could not rely on the security of their patents, and they
would have been forced to defend their patents rights through costly and
lengthy litigation.275
IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Supreme Court wisely rejected the defense of a good faith
belief of invalidity of patents. Acknowledging such an exception would have
been akin to allowing the inducer to assert that he was mistaken about the
validity of a patent and escape liability for inducement. Mistake has never been
recognized as a valid defense in the fundamental areas of common law,
including tort, contract, and criminal law.
By rejecting the newly proffered affirmative defense, the Court upheld
Congress’s expressed wishes by reinforcing the presumption of the validity of
patents. Especially in this context, Cisco had no legitimate defense because it
failed to exhaust the judicial remedies afforded through a declaratory judgment
or through petitioning the patent office. As the old saying goes, “the road to
hell is paved with good intentions.” Thankfully, the Supreme Court decided
not to take that route here.

275

See Commil II, 135 S. Ct. at 1929; Pl.[‘s].–Appellee Br. Appeal at 47.
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